



# Philippines Natural Gas Master Plan – Transaction Structure

Phase Two Public Consultation

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Prepared for:



THE WORLD BANK

Supported by:



Prepared by:



THE LANTAU GROUP  
strategy & economic consulting

# Disclaimer

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*The World Bank commissioned the study, supported by AustralianAid, but the work is being done for DOE.*

*The views expressed in our Report and in this Forum are those of The Lantau Group.*

*DOE has only recently received the Phase Two report.*


*Nothing in our report, nor anything said today, should be taken as DOE policy.*

# Transaction Structure Recommendations

## Identified issues


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A linked transaction with a long chain of inter-related projects has very large transactional risk and should be avoided



## Recommendations

Decouple the LNG terminal decision from specific new power plant capacity decisions



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Demonstrable least-cost solution is critical if some of the costs are going to be passed to regulated consumers




- Market-test the opportunity through an open season for capacity
- Competitive selection process to find infrastructure supplier

## Preferred Option has two parts

### Facilitation

- Improve regulation of power sector to facilitate a space for mid-merit plant
  - Ideally by ensuring incentives for a balanced and economic plant mix
- Clarify downstream gas regulations and tax situation
- Clarify LNG terminal regulations (or lack of them) to give terminal certainty
- Education and capacity building
- Policy statements to support this




### Transaction Structure

- Backup Services for Malampaya
  - Paid for by regulated consumers
- Open Season to allow anyone else to purchase capacity in the terminal

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### Transaction Structure

- Backup Services for Malampaya
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**Tom will cover this section later**

## Transaction Component is focused on

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- Separating infrastructure from gas purchase, to fast track the infrastructure and allow options for gas purchasing
- Monetise the terminal on the basis of savings to franchise consumers – the simplest of which to realise is based on making backup to the existing gas supply cheaper
- Open the door for the various private sector entities to contract for terminal capacity on an open and transparent basis


# LNG terminal in Batangas to back-up Malampaya with balance of capacity for market

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- Recognised case for Government action to solve market failures in providing Malampaya backup
- Structure transaction around FSRU terminal as least cost option
  - Providers can be found through a tender process
- Implement in phases
  - Test strength of market demand with open season
  - If lost, revisit options for integrating LNG import with power sector
- Benefits are largely neutral to outcome of EWC in Pagbilao
- Potentially replicable in Mindanao
  - Terminal capacity in Mindanao could be used to break-bulk to Mindanao
  - Terminal technical specifications would have to include option for small ship loading




## There are three possible sites for LNG terminal connecting directly to Malampaya



- All plants can be backed up if gas is injected at any point in the existing system
- Sta Rita would require co-operation from First Gas
- Tabangao would require co-operation from SPEX
- Ilijan is a fall back option as it is essentially Government controlled



Schematically, the structure is as follows



## The FSRU would be owned by the private sector

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
- The Government role is one of facilitation only
  - Firstly to put in place the necessary structures to allow the cost of the backup to be recovered from electricity consumers
  - Secondly to run the first part of the open season and the tender to attract the best terminal
- All the contracts are private sector (except any with PSALM for backup of Ilijan)

## Transaction Flow: Malampaya Backup plus Open Season

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


## Transaction Flow: Malampaya Backup plus Open Season (2 of 7)



- Determine Government policies & convening power
- Assess Government-owned or -influenced assets to include as part of transaction
- Meet private sector stakeholders to agree their participation, if any
- Agree the form of the backup contract and how costs are passed to consumers
- Select transaction principal and advisors
- Discuss Preliminary Open Season with potential FSRU providers to gain process buy-in
- Gain any necessary consents / approvals

## Transaction Flow: Malampaya Backup plus Open Season (3 of 7)




## The Result of the Preliminary Open Season feed into the FRSU Tender

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- The outcome of the Preliminary Open Season will be the indicative amount and type of capacity (throughput, storage, contract duration, firmness) each Interested Party would like for each FSRU option under consideration.
- Comments on any modifications to the proposal that would better accommodate their needs; including at a minimum modifications regarding:
  - the date of commencement of service;
  - the service duration (in years; long term/short term);
  - the types of services on offer (firm/interruptible services); and
  - the intake and offtake points.
- This information is then an input into the FSRU Tender process.

## Transaction Flow: Malampaya Backup plus Open Season (4 of 7)






# FSRU Tender would be run similar to other Government Tender Processes by advisors


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- Prepare the FSRU Tender including details of what is on offer (Backup Contract) and what the obligations of the winning bidder will be
- Run the Tender and choose a Terminal (FSRU) Provider and Operator



The following slides discuss each of these components in detail

## Phase 1 of Tender: Obligations of the Bidder – this is the contract where the DOE defines what it wants out of the tender



A contract needs to be developed to set out all the obligations of the Bidder, so that the overall Objective is achieved. The obligations should be framed as broadly as possible to enable maximum participation

Specification of the quality of gas injected

Minimum specifications for MMBTU per hour injected into system (to power existing stations)

Location of injection point

Maximum Terminal Charge allowed to be charged

Terminal must be Open Access

Option for Malampaya (or Power Stations) to use terminal for 1 month per annum at agreed charge

Performance Bond and Bid Security


Approach potential customers for the project

## Phase 1 is also where the DOE sets out what's in it for the Bidders


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- Details of the Backup Contract
- Details from the Preliminary Open Season of who wants to contract for terminal capacity
- Details of the future demand for gas in Philippines including the Mindanao option to come later

## Phase 2 of Tender: How Bidder Meets Objective



## Phase 3 of Tender: Defining the winner




This is where the Bidder submits the Financial Component of the Bid.

Least-cost wins


Note: aligns the interests of the regulated customer base to least cost while giving the private sector maximum flexibility to use the rest of the terminal. This assumes there is no explicit regulation of terminal charges (as there is none at present) and that none is introduced..

## Phase 4 of Tender: Finalising the Transaction



- Subject to the FSRU following any requirements laid down in the Facilitation Agreement (such as the requirement for transparent dealing and Open Access), they are free to finalise the Open Season as they see fit


## Transaction Flow: Malampaya Backup plus Open Season (5 of 7)



- Selected FSRU Provider runs the Firm Open Season with aim of contracting with parties willing to commit to pay for terminal capacity
- Primarily a private sector activity
- FSRU Provider would carry out the process in the way that it deems appropriate
- Following a successful Firm Open Season, the FSRU Provider would move to achieve Financial Close
- FSRU Provider would be required to operate and maintain the terminal in accordance with the provisions of the agreements that are part of the FSRU Tender process with the objective of managing the business and growing the gas business in Philippines




## Transaction Flow: Malampaya Backup plus Open Season (6 of 7)



- Starts with Financial Close of the LNG terminal project
- FSRU commissioned by the supplier selected in the FSRU tender

## Transaction Flow: Malampaya Backup plus Open Season (7 of 7)



## Mindanao

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- Following a successful FSRU Tender in Luzon, we would recommend commencing a similar process in Mindanao.
- The reason for carrying out Mindanao second is that break bulking from Luzon to Mindanao may be an economic way to deliver the amount of gas required for the Mindanao market and having a Luzon terminal locked in place first should assist this process.
- The steps in Mindanao would be the same as for Luzon, with obvious differences in the Pre Tender Phase where different government assets, entities and contracts would need to be developed.

## A key question for Mindanao is “what is the prize”?

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- In Luzon, the Backup Service contract should be enough to underpin enough of a terminal result in a successful process. This does not exist in Mindanao.
- DOE could require oil-fired plants to convert to LNG or offer a similar contract to the Backup Service to incentivise the terminal, recovered from all the electricity customers in Mindanao.
  - However, the economic arguments for this are weak, particularly given the newly committed coal fired capacity has been developed since the previous study identified a role for gas in the Mindanao market.
- However, a sufficient package of benefits could include, for example:
  - A site (such as the PSALM site identified by Petroleum Brunei);
  - Changes to the way the Government-owned hydros are contracted (to economically “make room” for gas or other baseload fuels); and
  - Policies to require oil plants to convert to LNG should it become available.
  - If the process fails it will highlight that there is not an economic case for gas in Mindanao, even with the benefit of a larger terminal in Luzon that could lower overall costs.

# Policy instruments needed by Government to enable the private sector

## General market development

Facilitation strategy: Education and capacity building

Regulatory strategy: Clear guidance on how to review and approve oil to LNG conversions and mid-merit plant

## Specific development of terminal infrastructure

Issue policies to require LNG use as backup to Malampaya

Issue policies to facilitate diesel to LNG conversions

Facilitate an Open Season for a new terminal

Choose an FSRU provider to provide backup capacity and additional capacity for the private sector



**The Lantau Group**

4602-4606 Tower 1, Metroplaza  
223 Hing Fong Road  
Kwai Fong, Hong Kong

**Sarah Fairhurst**

[sfairhurst@lantaugroup.com](mailto:sfairhurst@lantaugroup.com)



**THE LANTAU GROUP**

strategy & economic consulting